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Abstract
This paper develops a search-theoretic model to study the interaction between banking and
monetary policy and how this interaction affects the allocation and welfare. Regarding how
banking affects the welfare costs of inﬂation: First, we ﬁnd that, with banking, inﬂation generates
smaller welfare costs. Second, we show that, lowering inﬂation improves welfare not just by
reducing consumption/production distortions, but also by avoiding intermediation costs.
Therefore, understanding the nature of intermediation cost is critical for accurately assessing the
welfare gain of lowering the inﬂation target. Regarding how monetary policy affects the welfare
effects of banking: First, banking always improves efﬁciency of production, but the banking
technology has to be efﬁcient to improve welfare (especially in low inﬂation economy). Second,
welfare effects of banking depend on monetary policy. For low inﬂation, banking is not active. For
high inﬂation, banking is active and improves welfare. For moderate inﬂation, banking is active
but reduces welfare. Owing to general equilibrium feedback, banking is supported in equilibrium
even though welfare is higher without banking.
JEL classiﬁcation: E40, E50
Bank classiﬁcation: Monetary policy framework
Résumé
Les auteurs élaborent un modèle théorique de recherche aﬁn d’étudier l’interaction entre l’activité
bancaire et la politique monétaire, tout comme l’incidence de cette interaction sur l’allocation des
ressources et le bien-être. L’activité bancaire est un facteur d’atténuation : c’est la première
conclusion que les auteurs tirent de l’analyse du rôle de l’activité bancaire au regard des coûts de
l’inﬂation sur le plan du bien-être. Ils montrent en second lieu qu’abaisser l’inﬂation accentue le
bien-être, non seulement parce que cette action réduit les distorsions de la consommation et de la
production, mais encore parce qu’elle permet d’éviter les coûts d’intermédiation. Saisir, par
conséquent, la nature du coût d’intermédiation est capital si l’on veut évaluer au plus près le gain
de bien-être attendu d’une cible d’inﬂation moins élevée. S’agissant de la façon dont la politique
monétaire modiﬁe les effets de l’activité bancaire sur le bien-être, les auteurs font deux constats.
D’abord, si l’intermédiation bancaire améliore toujours l’efﬁcience productive, le bien-être
n’augmente cependant qu’à condition que les banques disposent d’une technologie efﬁciente
(surtout au sein d’une économie à basse inﬂation). Ensuite, les effets de l’activité bancaire sur le
bien-être dépendent de la politique monétaire. Ainsi, l’intermédiation est limitée en régime de
basse inﬂation mais s’accroît et favorise le bien-être quand l’inﬂation est forte; à un taux
d’inﬂation modéré, elle est dynamique mais diminue le bien-être. L’enchaînement d’effets, révéléiv
à l’équilibre général, explique que l’activité bancaire soit soutenue à l’équilibre même si, sans
elle, le bien-être progresserait.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E40, E50
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Cadre de la politique monétaire1 Introduction
Central banks care about the welfare e®ects of changing the in°ation target. Existing mone-
tary theories generally agree that in°ation increases the opportunity cost of holding liquidity
and thus distorts the allocation of resources which require liquidity in transaction. Many
existing studies, however, abstract from ¯nancial intermediation, which plays an important
role in the allocation of liquidity in modern economies. Therefore, these existing studies
are not appropriate for investigating the interaction between ¯nancial intermediation and
monetary policy and how this interaction a®ects the allocation and welfare.
To study these questions, we developed a micro-founded monetary model which endoge-
nizes the roles of liquidity and ¯nancial intermediation. In particular, we explicitly model the
micro-economic frictions that generate the roles of liquid assets (e.g. money) and ¯nancial
intermediaries (e.g. banking) in facilitating the decentralized trading of production inputs.
We use the model to study the relationship between money, banking, and social welfare: i)
How banking a®ects the welfare costs of in°ation, ii) How monetary policy a®ects the welfare
e®ects of banking.
In this paper, we model the roles of competitive banks in channeling liquidity among
entrepreneurs in the decentralized trading of production projects (denoted as \ideas"). As
in Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2006), banks possess a record-keeping technology to keep
track of ¯nancial records of borrowers and lenders and take deposits and make loans at a
competitive interest rate. A key feature is that borrowing from banks may incur a ¯xed
intermediation cost.
Let us summarize the main ¯ndings of the paper:
1. How does banking a®ect the welfare costs of in°ation? First, we ¯nd that, with bank-
ing, in°ation generates smaller welfare costs. Second, we show that, reducing in°ation
improves welfare not just by lowering the consumption/production distortions, but also
by avoiding intermediation cost. Therefore, understanding the nature of intermedia-
tion cost is critical for accurately assessing the welfare gain of lowering the in°ation
2target.
2. How does monetary policy a®ect the welfare e®ects of banking? First, banking always
improves e±ciency of production, but the banking technology has to be e±cient to
improve welfare (especially in low in°ation economy). Second, welfare e®ects of banking
depend on monetary policy. For low in°ation, banking is not active. For high in°ation,
banking is active and improves welfare. For moderate in°ation, banking is active
but reduces welfare. Owing to general equilibrium feedback, banking is supported in
equilibrium even though welfare is higher without banking.
Let us brie°y describe our model and give the basic intuition of our main ¯ndings. In this
paper, banking is introduced to facilitate decentralized trading of production projects which
are essentially intermediate inputs for production. In particular, we builds on the setup
in Silveira and Wright (2007) to study the roles of banking in the market for production
projects (\ideas") which are used as an input for production. Owing to the anonymity in
the decentralized market for ideas, entrepreneurs need to bring liquidity (e.g., money) to
this market to purchase ideas. Since innovators (i.e., sellers of ideas) have di®erent random
reservation prices with respect to their ideas, some entrepreneurs may end up with too much
liquidity while others may end up with too little liquidity. The degree of this liquidity
constraint depends on the real value of money, which in turn depends on the in°ation rate.
In°ation reduces the real value of money, and thus makes the liquidity constraint more
binding. This problem can be resolved by having a ¯nancial intermediary (banks) which
channels the funds from entrepreneurs with excess liquidity to those lacking liquidity. The
welfare cost of in°ation is lower when the banking sector is better developed because, by
paying interest to deposit money, banking can reduce the opportunity cost of holding liquidity
(i.e. in°ation tax).
However, the use of banking involves ¯xed intermediation costs, in particular in enforc-
ing the repayment from the borrowers. Naturally, costly banking is used when in°ation is
relatively high (liquidity problem is severe) and is not used when in°ation is relatively low
3(liquidity problem is mild). Therefore, in an economy with low in°ation, the banking sector
has to be more e±cient (lower intermediation cost) for it to be welfare-improving.
An interesting ¯nding is that, in an economy with moderate in°ation, banking is used
even though it is welfare-reducing. The intuition is that, when an entrepreneur chooses
to borrow from a ¯nancial intermediary, he considers only his own net private gain from
borrowing, ignoring the general equilibrium e®ect. However, borrowing will also lower his
demand for money in the money market, and thus reduce the equilibrium value of money. A
lower value of money is going to tighten other entrepreneurs' liquidity constraints, pushing
more entrepreneurs to (costly) borrow. This will lead to welfare loss to society.
Apparently, by studying the market for ideas, our paper is closely related to Silveira
and Wright (2007). Note that while we choose to study banking in the market for ideas,
we do expect that the main ¯ndings of our paper can be generalized and applied to other
decentralized trading. The way banking is modeled in this paper is related to Berentsen,
Camera and Waller (2006). There are two key di®erences. First, Berentsen, Camera and
Waller study environment in which enforcement of repayment by borrowers is either costless
or in¯nitely costly. In our paper, there is prefect enforcement but is subject to a ¯nite ¯xed
cost. Second, the fractions of borrowers and lenders are ¯xed in their paper, but in our envi-
ronment, it is endogenous and depends on the monetary policy. These di®erences generate
some interesting new implications in our model. Another related paper is Bencivenga and
Camera (2007) who also study the relationship between in°ation and costly banking. We
focus on the ine±ciency of banking due to the competitive nature of the banking sector.
This type of ine±ciency is ruled out in their paper because a bank is modeled as an optimal
contract among a coalition of agents. He, Huang, and Wright (2005) also study banking
in the Lagos and Wright (2005) environment, but they focus on the safekeeping function of
banking. Other related micro-founded models of money and banking include Andolfatto and
Nosal (2003) and Sun (2007).
The road map is as follows. Section 2 describes the basic setup of the model. Section 3
considers an economy without banking. Section 4 and 5 then discuss economies with costless
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Figure 1: Timeline (No Banking)
and costly banking respectively. Section 6 considers various extensions. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 Environment
Our paper builds on the framework of the market for ideas developed by Lagos and Wright
(2005) and Silveira and Wright (2007) (SW) to study the roles of money and banking. Time
is discrete and denoted t = 0;1;2;:::. In this economy, there are two types of in¯nitely lived
agents: measure one of innovators (who are good at coming up with ideas), and measure one
of entrepreneurs (who are better at implementing ideas). There are two markets: centralized
market, denoted CM, and a decentralized market, denoted DM. In this economy, there is an
additional, perfectly divisible, and costlessly storable object which cannot be produced or
consumed by any private individual, called ¯at money.
The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1. Each period is divided into two sub-
periods. In the ¯rst sub-period, agents implement ideas, perform production and consump-
5tion and money holding adjustment in the CM. In the second sub-period, agents meet bi-
laterally in the DM and trade ideas which are implemented in the next CM. When the DM
opens, each innovator comes up with a new idea that can be implemented in the following
CM. By implementation, we mean that the idea will be used as an input in the production
of the consumption good. The input value of an idea depends on who the implementor is.
Entrepreneurs are good at implementing ideas. If an idea is implemented by an entrepreneur,
it has an input value Ie = 1 and generates a return Re = R(Ie). Innovators are not good
at implementation and cannot realize the full values of ideas. If an idea is implemented
by an innovator, it has a lower input value, Ii · Ie = 1, and thus yields a lower return
Ri = R(Ii) · Re. Here, we assume that Ii is an i.i.d. random variable with a uniform
(0,1) distribution, and its value is known when one enters the DM. If an innovator meets
an entrepreneur in the DM, the former has an idea which can generate a return Ri for him,
and can generate a return Re for the latter.1 When they meet, both entrepreneurs and
innovators observe (Ri;Re). Because of the lack of information on trading history and the
lack of commitment of entrepreneurs, money is required for the trading of ideas. The price
at which an idea is traded is in terms of money, by which we mean some liquid assets the
entrepreneur has on hand. The discount factor between one DM and the next CM is ¯. For
simplicity, we will ¯rst consider the case in which an idea is both indivisible and rivalry. We
discuss more general cases in Section 6.
2.1 The CM
In the CM, agents implement ideas, produce, consume and adjust their money holding. We
are going to consider a stationary environment. In a typical period, the utility of an agent
is given by
U(X) ¡ H;
1Here, Ie being 1 is a normalization. Also, SW consider a more general case in which both innovators
and entrepreneurs have random valuations.
6where U : R+ ! R denotes the utility of consuming X ¸ 0 units of the consump-
tion good, and H 2 R+ denotes the labor e®ort on production. We assume that U(:) is
twice continuously di®erentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satis¯es U(0) = 0,
U0( ¹ X) = 1 for some ¹ X > 0. We now describe the implementation of ideas by individual
j = i;e, where j = i denotes an innovator and j = e denotes an entrepreneur. Here, an idea
is simply an intermediate input into production. The production technology of an individual
j is
F(Ij;h);
where h is the employment of labor input, and F : [0;1]£R+ ! R+ denotes the production
function. As a result, given real wage rate, w, in the CM, the return from implementing an







That is, the return is equal to the output net of the employment cost evaluated at the
pro¯t-maximizing level of employment. For simplicity, we ¯rst consider the case in which
F(Ij;h) = Ij + h. Under this simplifying assumption, Rj = R(Ij) = Ij and w = 1.2 Since
Re = Ie ¸ Ii = Ri, it is e±cient to have entrepreneurs implementing all the ideas. However,
due to the trading frictions and the liquidity constraint in the decentralized market, ideas
may not be allocated e±ciently.
We now describe agents' money holding. Agents can hold any non-negative amount of
money ^ m 2 R+. The total money stock at the beginning of the CM is M. The gross growth
rate is ¹ = M
M¡1, where M¡1 denotes the money stock in the previous period. Agents receive
lump sum monetary transfers at the entrance of the CM. In what follows we express an
agent's money holding as a fraction of the beginning of the period money supply: ^ m
M. Let
m and ~ m denote the normalized individual money holdings at the beginning of the CM and
the DM respectively.
2We will discuss the general case in Section 6.
7Let Á 2 R+ be the price of money balance in terms of the consumption good in the
CM. We focus on stationary equilibrium in which the money growth rate, ¹, is constant
and the price of money is also constant over time. Let Wj(mj;R) be the value function for
entrepreneurs (j = e) and innovators (j = i) entering the CM with mj money holding and
an idea with value R in hand. Then the budget constraint of agents in the CM is
R + H + Á(mj + ¢m) ¸ X + Á~ mj;
where ~ mj is money balance taken out of the CM, and ¢m is the lump sum money transfer
from the government. For j = i;e, the CM problem is
Wj(mj;R) = max
X;H; ~ mj¸0
U(X) ¡ H + Vj(~ mj)
s:t: X = H + R + Á(mj ¡ ~ mj + ¢m)
where Vj(~ mj) is the value function for entrepreneurs and innovators entering the DM
with ~ mj, before meetings occur. From now on, we will assume that the utility function U is
such that H > 0 even for the richest agents, so that we can focus on interior solution. Under
this assumption, the budget constraint can be used to eliminate H in the objective function,
simplifying the Wj to
Wj(mj;R) = Ámj + Á¢m + R + max
X
fU(X) ¡ Xg + max
~ mj
f¡Á~ mj + Vj(~ mj)g (1)
= Wj(0;0) + Ámj + R;
where Wj(0;0) = Á¢m + U( ¹ X) ¡ ¹ X + max ~ mjf¡Á~ mj + Vj(~ mj)g. Therefore, Wj(mj;R)
is linear in both mj and R. We will use this result to derive the bargaining solution below.
82.2 The DM
When an entrepreneur and an innovator meet in the DM, the value of Ri is observed by both
agents. Since Ri · Re = 1, the entrepreneur can always implement the idea at least as good
as the innovator. E±ciency requires that all ideas be implemented by the entrepreneurs.
Owing to liquidity constraints in the market for ideas, this e±cient allocation may not be
supported. Let p 2 R+ denote the money price they would agree if there were no issues of
liquidity. The liquidity constraint requires that ~ me ¸ p. For simplicity, we assume that the
price is determined by take-it-or-leave-it o®ers from the entrepreneur.3
3 Economy Without Banking
Innovator in DM
We ¯rst examine the case without banking. Consider an innovator bringing money hold-








Here, the innovator does not spend her money balance and brings it forward to the next
CM. The real value of this money balance (in terms of CM good) in the next CM is
Á ~ mi
¹ .
Note that the next period money balance is re-scaled by the money growth rate because we
normalize the money balance by the total stock of money. Also, we have made use of the
result in (1) to evaluate the value in the next CM. If the innovator sells her idea at a price
p, her payo® is
¯Wi(
~ mi + p
¹
;0) = ¯Wi(0;0) + Á¯
~ mi + p
¹
:
Here, the innovator's real money balance in the next CM is increased by Á
p
¹. Therefore,
3Silveira and Wright (2007) consider a more general case in which the price is determined by generalized
Nash bargaining. Also, in their model, the innovator and the entrepreneur have an option to meet again in
the next CM where the entrepreneur can raise more money. We abstract from these interesting extensions
to focus on the e®ects of banking on the market for ideas in the simplest possible case.
9the innovator has a reservation price ¹ p(Ri) =
Ri¹
Á for an idea Ri. Apparently, the reservation
price is increasing in Ri.4
Entrepreneur in DM
Consider an entrepreneur with money holding ~ me meeting an innovator with idea Ri.
The bargaining solution implies that, if ~ me ¸ ¹ p(Ri), then the entrepreneur can a®ord to buy
the idea and get a payo® of V 1
e (~ me;Ri) given by
V
1
e (~ me;Ri) = ¯We(0;0) + ¯Re + ¯Á
~ me ¡ ¹ p(Ri)
¹
: (2)
Here, the entrepreneur obtains the idea and the real money balance in the next CM is
reduced by Á
p
¹. If ~ me < ¹ p(Ri), the entrepreneur is liquidity constrained and cannot a®ord
to purchase the idea and gets
V
0




Whether the innovator trades or not, he gets ¯(Wi(0;0) + Ri) + Á¯
~ mi
¹ : the innovator
receives no trade surplus because she has no bargaining power.
Demand for money in CM














An innovator's optimal choice of money balance taken to the DM (i.e., ~ mi in (1)) is the
4For simplicity, we ¯rst consider the case in which lottery is not allowed. We will discuss the case where
lottery is available in Section 6.
10solution to max ~ mi[¡Á~ mi + Vi(~ mi)] and is given by
~ mi
8
> > > <




if ¹ > ¯
if ¹ = ¯
if ¹ < ¯
(5)
That is, an innovator chooses not to bring any money to the DM if the money growth
rate is higher than ¯, indi®erent between any amount of money if the money growth rate is
equal to ¯, and to bring an in¯nite amount if the money growth rate is lower than ¯. We
will focus on cases with ¹ ¸ ¯ and assume that when innovators are indi®erent they choose
~ mi = 0. The intuition is that, since innovators do not spend money in the DM, they do not
have incentives to bring any money to the DM if the opportunity cost is strictly positive






















The two terms on the right hand side of the ¯rst equality capture the case when ~ me ¸
¹ p(Ri) and ~ me · ¹ p(Ri). The second equality is derived by using (2) and (3). An en-
trepreneur's optimal choice of money balance taken to the DM (i.e., ~ me in (1)) is the solution






The money market equilibrium in the CM requires
11~ me + ~ mi = 1: (7)
Denote the equilibrium price of money (with no banking) as ÁNB. Under the simplifying
assumption that ~ mi = 0 for ¹ ¸ ¯, we de¯ne the equilibrium as follows.
De¯nition 1. A stationary monetary equilibrium without banking is given by ÁNB satisfying
(6) and (7) with ÁNB > 0.
Proposition 1. (Existence of equilibrium without banking) For any ¹ 2 [¯;2¯], there exists
a stationary monetary equilibrium without banking.
If ¹ > ¯, then ~ mi = 0 and ~ me = 1. (6) then implies ÁNB = 2¹ ¡ ¹2=¯ which is
non-negative for ¹ · 2¯:5 When ¹ ¸ 2¯, money has no value and there is no monetary
equilibrium (i.e., no ideas are traded).6 Let ¹ RNB
i 2 [0;1] be the cut-o® value of Ri such that
an entrepreneur's liquidity constraint is just binding: ~ me = ¹ p(Ri). In equilibrium, ~ me = 1
and this cut-o® is pinned down by the condition
¹ R
NB
i ¹ = Á
NB
The left-hand-side of the equation is the real reservation price of the marginal entrepreneur
in terms of the current period consumption good while the right-hand side is the maximum
real price an entrepreneur is able to pay (i.e., the real money balance ÁNB ~ me = ÁNB).7 In
Figure 2, the left-hand-side is represented by the upward sloping line and the right-hand-side
is represented by the horizontal line.8 So the equilibrium amount of trade is given by:
5The upper bound being 2¯ is a result of the assumptions of Re = 1 and Ri » U(0;1).
6Note that the non-existence of monetary equilibrium for high money growth rates is related to the
assumptions that ideas are indivisible and that lotteries are not allowed. Please see Section 6.
7Since the nominal price (in terms of a fraction of the current money stock) is p =
Ri¹
Á , the real price (in
terms of the current period goods) is given by pÁ = Ri¹.
8One may interpret the ¯gure as a supply-demand diagram which determines the equilibrium given a
\demand curve" (Á) and a \supply curve" (Ri¹).









Note that there exists a unique stationary monetary equilibrium for ¹ 2 [¯;2¯] and that
money growth always reduces trade. When ¹ = ¯, the opportunity cost of holding money
is zero. As a result, no entrepreneurs are liquidity constrained and all ideas are traded (i.e.,
¹ RNB
i = 1).
Summarizing the ¯ndings in an economy without banking:
² At the Friedman's rule, all ideas are traded.
² When the in°ation is moderate, a unique monetary equilibrium exists. In°ation reduces
trades.
² When the in°ation is high, there is no monetary equilibrium (in the absence of lotter-
ies).
In Figure 2, an entrepreneur with Ri · ¹ RNB
i =
ÁNB
¹ buys the idea at p = Ri¹. After
trade, these entrepreneurs still have money left over. The total real money surplus is
(ÁNB)2
2¹ .
For the rest of the entrepreneurs, they are liquidity constrained and need extra funding to
purchase the idea. The total money shortage is (1¡
ÁNB
¹ )2¹=2. Therefore, there is a potential
role for borrowing and lending between entrepreneurs whenever ¹ > ¯.
134 Economy with Costless Banking
We now introduce intermediation into the economy and study the interaction between money
and banking. Suppose in the DM there are competitive ¯nancial intermediaries (banks)
taking deposits at an interest rate rD and making loans at an interest rate rL. As in
Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2006), each bank has a record keeping technology allowing
it to keep ¯nancial record of agents. Here, we assume that banks specialize in channeling
funding across entrepreneurs.9 In particular, entrepreneurs can commit to repay the bank in
the CM and banks can commit to repay depositors in the CM. Free entry implies zero pro¯t
for banks and thus rD = rL = r for some r ¸ 0. Figure 3 shows the sequence of events.
In the DM, after meeting and observing the realization of Ri, an entrepreneur can choose
to lend money to or borrow money from a bank before trading. In the next CM, deposits
and loans will be repaid. In general, an entrepreneur meeting an innovator with low Ri has
excess liquidity and would like to lend his surplus money holding to a bank after trade to earn
interest income. An entrepreneur meeting an innovator with high Ri may ¯nd the surplus
from trade smaller than the return from deposit and chooses instead to lend all his money
holding to the bank. An entrepreneur with intermediate level of Ri is liquidity constrained
and will choose to borrow from the bank to ¯nance the trade. Figure 4 illustrates the °ow of
funds in the CM and DM. Anonymity of entrepreneurs in the market for ideas implies that
money is still needed as a medium of exchange.
A competitive representative bank takes rL and rD as given, and chooses the amount of






s.t. d ¸ l
9Note that, in equilibrium, innovators do not have incentives to use banking even if they have access to
banking. Also, we assume that banks cannot issue inside money in this economy. Equivalently, one can also
allow banks to issue inside money but subject to an 100% reserve requirement.
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Figure 4: Flow of Funds
15Here, there is a feasibility constraint restricting that the amount of loans lent out has
to be no more than the amount of deposits taken in. In equilibrium, it cannot be the
case that rL > rD, otherwise banks will choose l = d = +1, implying ¼ = +1. When
rL < rD, banks choose l = d = 0 to earn ¼ = 0. This cannot clear the loan market when
entrepreneurs choose to save a positive amount. So whenever there is positive saving, we






if r > 0
if r = 0
(8)
In both cases, pro¯ts of the banks are zero.
Entrepreneur's decision in DM
In general, entrepreneurs may have to incur an additional ¯xed cost ´ ¸ 0 to borrow from
the bank. This section considers the case with costless banking (´ = 0). We will consider
the general case with costly banking (´ > 0) in the next section.
After meeting in the DM, an entrepreneur with ~ me and Ri chooses the amount of saving
(lending if positive and borrowing if negative (s 2 R)), money brought to the next CM
(me 2 R+, as a fraction of next period money stock) and whether or not to buy the idea
(y 2 f0;1g) to maximize the expected payo®:
max
s;y;me





me¹ = ~ me ¡ y
Ri¹
Á
¡ s ¸ 0:
The budget constraint says that the amount of money brought to next period is equal to
the initial money holding minuses the expenditure on purchasing idea and saving. We need
to adjust the left-hand-side by the money growth rate because the two sides are normalized
by money stocks in two di®erent periods. Note that, by allowing borrowing (i.e. s < 0),
16banking relaxes the liquidity constraint of entrepreneurs. Substituting this budget constraint
into the objective function, we have
max
y;me
¯We(0;0) + ¯yRe + ¯
Á
¹









(1 + r)~ me + ¯ maxfRe ¡ (1 + r)Ri;0g: (9)
The last term captures an entrepreneur's comparison between the value of the idea (Re =
1) and the opportunity cost (including interest) of buying the idea ((1 + r)Ri). Therefore,








(1 + r)~ me + ¯ maxfRe ¡ (1 + r)Ri;0g
¸
dRi
Denote the optimal saving of an entrepreneur with (m;Ri) by s(~ me;Ri): (9) implies that





As a result, the value function of an entrepreneur entering the DM can be simpli¯ed to:
Ve(~ me) = ¯We(0;0) + ¯
Á
¹




(Re ¡ (1 + r)Ri)dRi
17Figure 5: Saving and Borrowing
Therefore, V 0
e(~ me) = ¯
Á
¹(1 + r) > 0 and thus the value function is linear. The market
clearing condition in the CM requires that
argmaxVe(~ me) ¡ Á~ me:
So, in equilibrium, the optimal money demand is characterized by the ¯rst order condition





Basically, the use of banking relaxes entrepreneur's liquidity constraint in purchasing
ideas in the DM. Therefore, when choosing the optimal amount of money brought to the
DM, an entrepreneur simply looks at whether the real rate of return of money is higher
18than the subjective discount rate (i.e., whether
Á
¹(1 + r) ¡ 1
¯ > 0) across two CM's. He will
demand ~ me = 0 when the real rate of return is lower than the subjective discount rate. He
will demand ~ me = +1 when the real rate of return higher than the subjective discount
rate, and will demand any ~ me 2 R+ when the rate of return is equal to the subjective
discount rate. To clear the money market in CM, the nominal interest rate, r, has to exactly
compensate for the in°ation and discounting.
Equilibrium
The cut-o® value of idea is thus ¹ RB
i = ¹ Ri(r) =
¯
¹. Entrepreneurs' optimal choices of (y;s)
as a function of Ri is illustrated by Figure 510:
8
> > > <
> > > :
y = 1;s = ~ me ¡
Ri¹
Á ¸ 0
y = 1;s = ~ me ¡
Ri¹
Á < 0
y = 0;s = ~ me ¸ 0
, if Ri 2 [0;
Á
¹]




, if Ri 2 ( ¹ RB
i ;1]
(11)
As discussed earlier, the entrepreneurs with low and high Ri's will save, and the en-
trepreneurs with medium Ri will borrow. Only the entrepreneurs with low and medium Ri's
will trade. The loan market clearing condition in the DM requires that the aggregate saving
from the entrepreneurs is equal to the total deposit minus the total loans:
Z 1
0
s(~ me;Ri)dRi = d ¡ l:





0 s(~ me;Ri)dRi = 0
R 1
0 s(~ me;Ri)dRi ¸ 0
, if r > 0
, if r = 0
Substituting in the saving functions from (11), we simplify the left-hand-side to ~ me¡
¯2
2¹Á.
10Here we assume that, when entrepreneurs are indi®erent between saving and not saving (which happens
when r = 0), they choose to save.










, if r > 0
, if r = 0
(12)
De¯nition 2. A stationary monetary equilibrium with costless banking is a pair (ÁB;r)
satisfying (10), (12) with ÁB > 0 , r ¸ 0.





¯ ¡1 > 0, ~ me = 1, ~ mi = 0 and ¹ RB
i =
¯







of entrepreneurs are borrowers and the rest are lenders. Since the interest rate in the loan
market is positive, the excess supply of loans is zero.
When ¹ = ¯, we have multiple equilibria: any ÁB 2 [
¯
2;1), r = 0, ~ me = 1, ~ mi = 0 and
¹ RB
i = 1. Fraction maxf1 ¡
ÁB
¹ ;0g of entrepreneurs are borrowers and the rest are lenders.
All these equilibria are equivalent in terms of real allocations and payo®s. They di®er only
in terms of the real value of money and the borrowing-lending decision in the DM. At the
lower bound where ÁB =
¯
2, half of the set of entrepreneurs are liquidity constrained and
need to borrow. The excess supply of loans is zero. As the value of money (ÁB) goes up,
fewer entrepreneurs are liquidity constrained and there are fewer borrowers. There is excess
supply of loans in the loan market, but it is consistent with the interest rate being zero. For
ÁB ¸ ¯, no entrepreneurs are liquidity constrained and there are no borrowers. Again, there
is excess supply of loans. Also, at the Friedman rule, a banking equilibrium with ÁB = ¯ is
identical to an equilibrium without banking.
In°ation, Banking and Welfare
Note that the measure of trade (
¯
¹) is decreasing in in°ation. Maximum amount of trade
( ¹ RB
i = 1) is achieved when ¹ = ¯. Measuring the welfare by the average utility of all agents,
we have the welfare for k = NB;B given by:
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The three terms on the right-hand-side of the ¯rst equality capture respectively the
surplus in the CM, the value of ideas implemented by entrepreneurs and the value of ideas
implemented by innovators. In particular, we have
¹ W







where the second term captures the welfare gain from a better allocation of ideas. Now,
we will compare the allocation with and without banking. Note that, without banking, the
cut-o® value, ¹ RNB
i , is pinned down by the money demand decision. In equilibrium, the ¯rst
order condition (6) implies
Á
¹















The left- and right-hand sides capture respectively the bene¯t and cost of bringing the
marginal dollar to the DM. Bringing one extra dollar to the DM relaxes the liquidity con-
straint and allows
Á
¹ more extra trades, each of which generates payo® 1 ¡ ¹ RNB
i in terms of
next period utility. At the same time, bringing one extra dollar incurs a (net) opportunity
cost of (
¹





With banking, the cut-o® value, ¹ RB
i , is pinned down by the borrowing decision. In
equilibrium, condition (10) implies





¡ 1) ¹ R
B
i (14)
The left- and right-hand sides capture respectively the bene¯t and cost of borrowing for
the marginal entrepreneur in the DM. Comparing the right-hand sides of (13) and (14), we
can see that banking reduces entrepreneurs' cost of buying ideas: by lending out the money
balance unused for trade, the excess balance is no longer subject to in°ation and discounting.
Proposition 2. (In°ation and welfare with costless banking)
(i) When ¹ = ¯, ¹ RB
i = ¹ RNB
i = 1 and ¹ W B = ¹ W NB.
(ii) When ¹ 2 (¯;2¯], 1 > ¹ RB
i > ¹ RNB







0 > d ¹ WB
d¹ > d ¹ WNB
d¹ .
(iii) When ¹ > 2¯, ¹ RB
i > ¹ RNB
i = 0 and ¹ W B > ¹ W NB.
When ¹ = ¯, all ideas are traded and welfare is maximized with or without banking. In
this case, the existence of banking cannot improve welfare.
When ¹ 2 (¯;2¯], banking allows more ideas to be traded and thus implies higher
welfare. The marginal e®ect of in°ation is larger in magnitude when there is no banking
for two reasons. First, the marginal e®ect of in°ation on the number of trades is larger
without banking (i.e., j
d ¹ RNB
i
d¹ j > j
d ¹ RB
i
d¹ j). Condition (13) suggests that, without banking,
higher in°ation raises the opportunity cost of holding money, and thus less ideas are traded
(i.e., lower ¹ RNB
i ). Condition (14) suggests that, with banking, the impact of in°ation on
¹ RNB
i is smaller because unspent money holding can now be saved and thus does not subject
to the in°ation tax.
Second, the gain from the marginal trade is higher without banking (1¡ ¹ RNB
i > 1¡ ¹ RB
i ).
This is because the marginal value of trades is diminishing and because the number of trades
is higher with banking. Therefore, in°ation is less harmful in the presence of banking.
When ¹ > 2¯, monetary equilibrium does not exist without banking, but exists with













Figure 6: Welfare in No Banking and Costless Banking Equilibria
ideas. A very high in°ation will make the cost of holding money so high so that there is no
trades of ideas, implying zero value of money. With banking, there is an additional motive to
bring money to the DM to lend to the banks. With high in°ation, liquidity is relatively scarce
in the DM (i.e., excess demand for loans if the price of money does not adjust). The scarcity
of money in the DM induces entrepreneurs to demand more money in the CM, raising the
price of money, Á. As a consequence of a higher Á, entrepreneurs' liquidity constraints in
the DM are relaxed. So, when the money growth rate is higher than 2¯, banking is needed
to support a monetary equilibrium. (Figure 6)
Now, we compare the price of money in economies with banking (ÁB) and without banking





2¹), we have ÁNB(¯) > ÁB(¯) and ÁB(2¯) > ÁNB(2¯) = 0. Since ÁB(:) and
ÁNB(:) are strictly decreasing and continuous in ¹, we have the following result:
Proposition 3. (Value of money with costless banking) There exists a unique ¹¤ 2 (¯;2¯)
such that ÁNB(¹) R ÁB(¹) for ¹ Q ¹¤.
To see the intuition why banking reduces Á when ¹ is low and increases Á when ¹ is
high, let us consider the two cases illustrated in Figure 7. Start with an economy without
banking. At the Friedman rule, every entrepreneur is liquidity unconstrained and has excess
23Figure 7: Borrowing and Saving in DM for di®erent ¹
liquidity after trades. Banking is not needed. Close to the Friedman rule (i.e., with low ¹),
the price of money is relatively high and most ideas are traded. Now, suppose we introduce
banking into this economy. Let's ¯rst look at the partial equilibrium in the DM by keeping
the original Á unchanged. As illustrated in the ¯gure, there is excess supply of loans in the
DM, driving the interest rate r to 0. Now, we consider the determination of Á in the general
equilibrium. Anticipating r = 0 in the DM, entrepreneurs have lower incentive to demand
money in the CM (because they can always borrow at r = 0 in the DM). As a result, the
equilibrium price of money in the CM has to go down. Since the real money demand is
Á~ m = Á, the use of banking comes with a lower demand for real money balances. In a sense,
banking is a substitute for real money balances when the money growth rate is low.
Now, consider an economy without banking and ¹ is high. The equilibrium price of
money is relatively low and most ideas are not traded. Now, suppose we introduce banking
into this economy and again look at the partial equilibrium in the DM by keeping the original
Á unchanged. As illustrated in the ¯gure, there is excess demand for loans in the DM, driving
up the interest rate r. But, in the general equilibrium, anticipating a high r in the DM,
entrepreneurs have now higher incentive to demand money in the CM (because they do not
want to borrow at a high rate and can always save at a high r in the DM). As a result, the
24equilibrium price of money in the CM has to go up. In this case, banking is a complement
for real money balances when the money growth rate is high.
Summarizing the ¯ndings for an economy with costless banking:
² At the Friedman's rule, banking is not used.
² Above the Friedman rule, banking is used and is welfare-improving.
² When the in°ation rate is low, banking reduces the price of money. Banking and real
money balances are substitutes.
² When the in°ation rate is high, banking increases the price of money. Banking and
real money balances are complements.
² When banking is used, in°ation is less harmful.
5 Economy with Costly Banking
Entrepreneur's decision in DM
Suppose entrepreneurs have to incur a ¯xed e®ort/utility cost, ´, to borrow but no cost
to deposit. One can consider Section 3 as analyzing the case when this ¯xed cost is in¯nite,
and Section 4 as analyzing the case when such cost is zero. Now, we consider the general
case. One may interpret it as the borrower's cost of credibly committing to repay. An
entrepreneur in the DM chooses saving (s), money brought to the CM (me) and whether or
not to buy the idea (y 2 f0;1g):
max
s;y;me
¯We(0;0) + ¯yRe + ¯
Á
¹




subject to me¹ = ~ me ¡ y
Ri¹







, if s < 0
, if s ¸ 0:
25Again, the non-negativity constraint for me requires that rme = 0. Also, there is no
reason to pay the ¯xed cost and borrow unless an entrepreneur is liquidity constrained. So,
¶(s) = 0 when ~ me ¡ y
Ri¹




¯We(0;0) + ¯ maxf1 +
Á




¹(1 + r)~ meg
¯We(0;0) + ¯ maxf1 +
Á






¹(1 + r)~ meg
, if ~ me ¸
Ri¹
Á
, if ~ me <
Ri¹
Á
If ~ me ¸ ¹ p(Ri) =
Ri¹
Á , an entrepreneur is not liquidity constrained and will choose to save
and trade if and only if
Ri · ¹ R1 ´
1
1 + r
If ~ me < p =
Ri¹
Á , an entrepreneur is liquidity constrained and will choose to borrow and
trade if and only if







The optimal choice of an entrepreneur given any (~ me;Ri) pair is shown in Figure 8. Above
the upward-sloping line Á~ me = Ri¹, entrepreneurs are not liquidity constrained. In this case,
they choose to trade whenever Ri · ¹ R1. Below the upward-sloping line, entrepreneur are
liquidity constrained. In this case, they choose to trade whenever Ri · ¹ R2. Note that
¹ R1 > ¹ R2.
To solve for the equilibrium, we consider two di®erent cases separately: Á~ me · ¹ R2¹
and Á~ me > ¹ R2¹. In the ¯rst case, the real value of money is so low that some liquidity
constrained entrepreneurs want to borrow, implying r ¸ 0. In the second case, the real value
of money is so high that all entrepreneurs are not willing to borrow, implying r = 0.
Case 1: Á~ me 2 [0; ¹ R2¹]
Note that an equilibrium with r > 0 can only exist when some entrepreneurs choose to
26Figure 8: Optimal Choice of Entrepreneur
borrow (i.e., s(1;Ri) < 0 for some Ri). As Figure 8 suggests, this requires Á < ¹ R2¹ (since
~ me = 1 in equilibrium). Now, let us ¯rst characterize this equilibrium and then we can derive
the condition for the existence of this equilibrium. In this equilibrium, an entrepreneur brings
~ me = 1 to the DM and an entrepreneur chooses to trade and save if Ri 2 [0;
Á
¹], chooses to
trade and borrow if Ri 2 (
Á
¹; ¹ R2] and chooses to save and not trade if Ri 2 ( ¹ R2;1]. As shown
in the Appendix, the value function over the relevant region (which is [0;
¹ R2¹
Á ]) is given by
Ve(~ me) = ¯(We(0;0) + Re) ¡
¯(1 + r) ¹ R2
2
2
¡ ¯ ¹ R2(1 + r)(1 ¡ ¹ R2) ¡ ´ +
Á
¹




¹[¯(1 + r) + ´]. The idea is that the marginal value of bringing
an extra dollar to the DM consists of two components. The ¯rst part is the real return of
money (i.e., ¯
Á
¹(1 + r)). The second part is that it helps to reduce the likelihood of being
liquidity constrained and thus avoiding the expected ¯xed cost of borrowing a loan (i.e.,
Á
¹´).
Again, Ve is linear in ~ me in this region. In equilibrium, the money market clearing condition,
27~ me = 1, implies that the ¯rst order condition with respect to the money demand in the CM
has to be satis¯ed with equality (i.e., V 0





When (16) is satis¯ed, entrepreneurs are indi®erent between any ~ me 2 [0;
¹ R2¹
Á ]. The
equilibrium condition ~ me = 1 then requires that
Á · ¹ R2¹: (17)
Let ¹ RCB
i denote the cut-o® value of idea such that an entrepreneur is indi®erent between
trading or not. Condition (15) implies ¹ RCB
i = ¹ R2 =
¯¡´
¹¡´.
As in condition (12), we can use the banks' optimal decision to derive equilibrium con-
ditions regarding the excess supply of loans and the interest rate. The loan market clearing










, if r > 0
, if r = 0










, if r > 0
, if r = 0
(18)
Equilibrium
De¯nition 3. A stationary monetary equilibrium with costly banking is a pair (ÁCB;r)
satisfying (16), (17) , (18) with ÁCB > 0 , r ¸ 0.
28We have the following result (derived in the Appendix):
Proposition 4. (Existence of equilibrium with costly banking) If ´ · minf¯;¹ ¡ ¯g, there
exists an equilibrium with costly banking.










2(¹¡´)2 > 0 of entrepreneurs are borrowers.





r = 0, and ¹ RCB
i = 1 ¡
´
¯. Corresponding to these equilibria, the equilibrium fraction of
borrowers is maxf ¹ RCB ¡
ÁCB
¯ ;0g 2 [0;
(¯¡´)(¯+´)
2¯2 ]. These equilibria are equivalent in terms
of the allocation of ideas but are not payo® equivalent due to the ¯xed cost of borrowing.
With the highest value of money (i.e., ÁCB =
(¯¡´)(¯+´)
¯ ), there are no borrowers and thus no
¯xed cost is incurred. As the value of money goes down, there are more and more borrowers
and thus a higher total amount of ¯xed cost is incurred.
Now, we take a look at the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with costly
banking (i.e., ´ · minf¯;¹ ¡ ¯g). Firstly, if ¯ < ´, the payo® of getting an idea (¯Re = ¯)
is lower than the ¯xed cost (´), and thus no entrepreneurs want to borrow even when the
price of the idea is zero. Secondly, note that the net real rate of return of buying money in
the CM is




¯r + (¯ + ´ ¡ ¹)
¹
:
Since r ¸ 0, if ´ > ¹ ¡ ¯, then the net real rate of return is always positive, implying
entrepreneurs would demand an in¯nite amount of money in the CM.
Case 2: Á~ me 2 ( ¹ R2¹;1)
As shown in Figure 8, there is no borrowing in this equilibrium, implying r = 0, and
accordingly ¹ R1 = 1. The equilibrium allocation is exactly the same as an equilibrium without
banking: entrepreneurs with Ri ·
Á









Figure 9: In°ation and Price of Money
rate. In this case, the equilibrium price of money is ÁNB which is derived in section 3. No
entrepreneur has an incentive to borrow at a zero rate when the surplus from trade cannot
cover the ¯xed cost of borrowing for the entrepreneur drawing Ri =
ÁNB
¹ . As shown in the
Appendix, this equilibrium exists when
(´ + ¯ ¡ ¹)(¯ ¡ ´) > 0 (19)
In°ation, Banking and Welfare
Proposition 5. (Banking and Trading) If ´ · minf¯;¹ ¡ ¯g, then ¹ RNB
i · ¹ RCB
i · ¹ RB
i .
Less ideas are traded with costly banking than with costless banking. More ideas are
traded in an equilibrium with banking than in an equilibrium without banking. As shown
in the last section, costly banking is a substitute for real money balances when the in°ation
rate is low, and is a complement when the in°ation rate is high.11 As shown in Figure 5:
Proposition 6. (Value of money with costly banking) There exists a unique ¹¤ 2 (¯+´;2¯)
such that ÁNB(¹) R ÁCB(¹) for ¹ Q ¹¤.
11Apparently, ÁB > ÁCB because
dÁ
CB




¯ and ÁCB(¹) =
¹(¯¡´)
2
2(¹¡´)2 ), we have ÁNB(¯ + ´) > ÁB(¯ + ´) and ÁB(2¯) > ÁNB(2¯) = 0. Since
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Figure 10: Value Function of an Entrepreneur in DM
While banking can increase trades, it also incurs the ¯xed cost. We can measure the
welfare by the average utility of entrepreneurs and innovators. As before, when there is no
banking, the welfare is
¹ W









= 2(U( ¹ X) ¡ ¹ X) + 1 ¡
(1 ¡ ¹ RNB
i )2
2
When there is costly banking (i.e., ¹ ¸ ´ + ¯), the welfare is
¹ W
CB(¹) = 2(U( ¹ X) ¡ ¹ X) + 1 ¡


























31Therefore, the e®ects of banking on welfare can be decomposed into two parts: welfare
gain from a better allocation of ideas and the welfare cost due to the ¯xed cost which is the




Now, we compare the steady state welfare between economies with di®erent money growth
rates, ¹. We have shown that, for ¹ 2 [¯;¯ + ´), banking is not viable and thus the welfare
is given by ¹ W NB. As discussed above, when ¹ = ¯ + ´, there is a continuum of banking
equilibria with di®erent welfare levels. All these equilibria support the same amounts of
trades ( ¹ RCB = ¹ RNB) but incur di®erent amounts of ¯xed cost. There is a \high welfare
equilibrium" associated with a high value of money and zero ¯xed cost. There is also a
continuum of \low welfare equilibria" associated with lower values of money and positive
amounts of ¯xed cost incurred. The lowest welfare level among these \low welfare equilibria"
is given by ¹ W CB(¯ + ´). It is easy to show that ¹ W CB(¯ + ´) < ¹ W NB(¯ + ´). By the
continuity of ¹ W NB and ¹ W CB, for su±ciently small ¢ > 0, we still have ¹ W CB(¯ + ´ + ¢) <
¹ W NB(¯ + ´ + ¢). Therefore, for moderate in°ation, even though banking is used, it does
not improve welfare. An economy without banking can achieve a higher welfare.
The welfare ranking is reversed when the in°ation rate is high. In particular, when
¹ = 2¯, ¹ RNB
i = 0 and ¹ W NB(2¯) = 2(U( ¹ X) ¡ ¹ X) + 1
2. The welfare level in a banking
equilibrium is12
12Speci¯cally, the welfare level in an economy with costly banking is
¹ WCB(2¯) = 2(U( ¹ X) ¡ ¹ X) + 1 ¡
(1 ¡ ¹ RCB
i )2
2





= 2(U( ¹ X) ¡ ¹ X) + 1 ¡
¯2
2(2¯ ¡ ´)2 ¡ ´
(¯ ¡ ´)(2¯ ¡ ´)
2(2¯ ¡ ´)2
> 2(U( ¹ X) ¡ ¹ X) + 1 ¡
¯2
2(2¯ ¡ ´)2 ¡
(¯ ¡ ´)(2¯ ¡ ´)
2(2¯ ¡ ´)2
= 2(U( ¹ X) ¡ ¹ X) + 1 ¡
¯2
2(2¯ ¡ ´)2 ¡
3¯2 ¡ 4¯´ + ´2
2(2¯ ¡ ´)2





CB(2¯) = 2(U( ¹ X) ¡ ¹ X) + 1 ¡
(1 ¡ ¹ RCB
i )2
2








Therefore, we have the following result:
Proposition 7. (In°ation and Welfare) For any ´ 2 (0;minf¯;¹¡¯g), there exists ¢1;¢2 >
0 such that
(i) ¹ W CB < ¹ W NB for any ¹ 2 [¯ + ´;¯ + ´ + ¢1],
(ii) ¹ W CB > ¹ W NB, for any ¹ 2 [2¯ ¡ ¢2;+1].
This is illustrated in Figure 11. The idea is that banking has both positive and negative
e®ects on welfare. On the negative side, use of banking incurs a ¯xed cost which is a
deadweight loss to society. On the positive side, banking improves the allocation of ideas.
Note that the improvement of welfare depends on the in°ation rate. When the in°ation rate
is low, most of the ideas are e±ciently allocated even without banking, thus the gain from
trading those remaining ideas is small. In this case, the welfare improvement from better
allocation of ideas is outweighed by the deadweight loss. When the in°ation rate is high,
most of the ideas are not traded without banking. In this case, the welfare improvement
from better allocation of ideas outweighs the deadweight loss.
Why is banking used even though it is welfare-reducing? This is because, when an
entrepreneur decides on whether to borrow or not, he takes into account only his own private
cost and bene¯t. He chooses to borrow whenever the net private gain from borrowing is
larger than the ¯xed cost, ignoring the general equilibrium feedback e®ect. In particular, a
borrower neglects that his borrowing in the DM reduces his demand for money in the CM.
As a result, the price of money in the CM goes down. In equilibrium, a drop in the price
of money will tighten other entrepreneurs' liquidity constraints, pushing more entrepreneurs
to costly borrow from banks. So an individual's choice to borrow from a bank can lead to
















Figure 11: Welfare, In°ation and Banking
Now, we study the welfare e®ect of changing the ¯xed cost.
Proposition 8. (Fixed Cost and Welfare) For any ¹ 2 (¯;2¯), there exists e ¢1; e ¢2 > 0 such
that
(i) ¹ W CB > ¹ W NB, for any ´ 2 [0; e ¢1],
(ii) ¹ W CB < ¹ W NB, for any ´ 2 [¹ ¡ ¯ ¡ e ¢2;¹ ¡ ¯].
(iii) For ¹ = 1, there exists an ¹ ´ 2 (0;1 ¡ ¯) such that,
8
> > > <
> > > :
¹ W CB > ¹ W NB
¹ W CB = ¹ W NB
¹ W CB < ¹ W NB
if ´ < ¹ ´
if ´ = ¹ ´
if ´ > ¹ ´
Proposition 2 implies that, when the ¯xed cost is zero, banking can always improve
welfare. By continuity, banking can improve welfare for small ¯xed costs. Moreover, for
a ¯xed cost su±ciently large relative to the in°ation rate, the deadweight loss of banking
outweighs the gain from a better allocation of ideas. Figure 12 plots various ¹ W CB for di®erent
sizes of the in°ation rate. When ¹ = ¯, the welfare is independent of the ¯xed cost, because
banking is never used. For ¹ > ¯, banking is used whenever ´ < ¹¡¯. Below this threshold,


















Figure 12: E®ect of Fixed Cost on Welfare
due to the general equilibrium feedback mentioned above, the welfare can be higher when
the ¯xed cost goes up. The implication is that the range of ¯xed costs that can support
banking is increasing in the in°ation rate.
Figure 13 shows the distribution of outcomes for di®erent combinations of the ¯xed
cost and money growth rate. In Figure 13, we can see that banking is used only when two
conditions are satis¯ed: (i) ´ < ¯ (indicated by the vertical line) and (ii) ´ < ¹¡¯ (indicated
by the upward-sloping straight line). Also, the curve indicating ¹ W CB = ¹ W NB is concave
because, when there is no banking, the marginal distortion of in°ation is increasing in money
growth rate. It is interesting to compare this result with Bencivenga and Camera (2007).
In their model, banking potentially can also reduce welfare, but this suboptimal outcome
cannot be supported in equilibrium because banking is modeled as an optimal contract.
Even when banking is costly, in°ation is less harmful whenever banking is used:
Proposition 9. (Banking and Welfare Cost of In°ation) For any ´ 2 (0;minf¯;¹ ¡ ¯g),
j d
d¹ ¹ W CBj < j d
d¹ ¹ W NBj:
One implication of this ¯nding is that, measuring the welfare gain of reducing in°ation
by extrapolating observable data from the high in°ation region with banking (far from the
Friedman's rule) to the unobservable low in°ation region without banking (close to the
35Figure 13: Distribution of Equilibrium
Friedman's rule), we may underestimate the actual welfare gain of following the Friedman's
rule because this approach ignores the intermediation cost involved in using banking to solve
liquidity problem. Mathematically, denote ¹ W CB(¹) as the level of welfare in an economy
with costly banking. The actual welfare gain of moving from an in°ation rate ¹ to the
Friedman's rule is G(¹) = ¹ W CB(¯) ¡ ¹ W CB(¹). A ¯rst order approximation of this welfare
gain is ^ G(¹) = d ¹ WCB(¹)
d¹ (¯ ¡ ¹). We can show that
Proposition 10. (Underestimation of Welfare Gain) For any ¹;¯, there exists an ¹ ´(¹;¯)
such that G(¹) > ^ G(¹) for all ´ 2 (¹ ´;¯).
The idea is that banking is used and the ¯xed intermediation cost is incurred only when
the in°ation rate is su±ciently high. As a result, measuring the welfare change by extrap-
olating from the high in°ation region (where banking is used) to the Friedman's rule (at
which banking is not used) does not take into account the potential saving of the ¯xed costs
as the money growth rate drops to ¯.
Summarizing the ¯ndings for an economy with costly banking:
² Banking improves the allocation of ideas.
² When the in°ation is low, banking is not used.
36² When the in°ation is high, banking is used and is welfare-improving. Banking increases
the price of money and the real money demand.
² When the in°ation is moderate, banking is used but is welfare-reducing. Banking
reduces the price of money and the real money demand.
² When banking is used, in°ation is less harmful.
6 Extensions
This section discusses the robustness of our ¯ndings when some of the simplifying assump-
tions are relaxed. First, we relax the assumption that \ideas" are pure private goods. In
particular, we assume that, after trading an idea, the entrepreneur receives the implemen-
tation value Re, while the innovator retains a fraction ¸ of her implementation value (i.e.,
¸Ri), with ¸ 2 (0;1).13 We can show that, there exists a ¹ ¸ such that for all ¸ · ¹ ¸, all our
¯ndings still hold true.14
Another simplifying assumption of our model is that ideas are indivisible and agents are
not allowed to use lotteries to convexify their bargaining problem. Now, we consider the case
in which it is feasible for agents to use lotteries. In particular, an o®er from an entrepreneur
to an innovator consists of a pair (p;µ), where p is the price paid by the entrepreneur
and µ 2 [0;1] is the probability of transferring the idea. While analytical solution is not
generally feasible, one can show numerically that all the main ¯ndings still hold true. The
only important di®erence from the benchmark case is that, in an economy without banking,
a monetary equilibrium always exists for any monetary growth rate.15
One interesting extension is to consider a general non-separable production function. In
13When ¸ = 0, it is the benchmark case when ideas are pure private goods. When ¸ = 1, ideas are pure
public goods. In this case, innovators will sell all their ideas at a zero price. E±ciency is always achieved.
Therefore, we will focus on the interesting case with ¸ 2 (0;1).
14In particular, banking can improve the allocation of ideas. When ¹ is low, banking is not used. When ¹ is
moderate, banking is used but is welfare-reducing. When ¹ is high, banking is used and is welfare-improving.
Also, banking is needed to support a monetary equilibrium when ¹ is high.
15The analysis and implications are the same if we assume that ideas are divisible instead of allowing for
lotteries.
37the Appendix, we discuss the case in which F(I;h) = If(h) with f0 > 0, and f00 < 0. In
this case, the equilibrium prices (r¤;w¤;Á¤) and the fraction of ideas traded, I¤, are jointly
determined. For example, an improved allocation of ideas in the DM will lead to a higher
labor demand, which then tends to drive up the wage rate in the CM. A high wage rate will
then a®ect the entrepreneurs' implementation returns relative to innovators' returns, and
thus has feedback e®ects on the allocation of ideas in the DM.
7 Conclusion
This paper develops a search-theoretical model to study how money and banking interact
to a®ect allocation and welfare. We highlight that banking and monetary models need to
be studied together for properly assessing the welfare e®ect of banking and the welfare cost
of in°ation. An interesting implication of our model is that, due to general equilibrium
feedback, banking can exist in equilibrium even when it is welfare-reducing. Moreover,
the non-linear welfare e®ect of in°ation implies that measuring welfare cost of in°ation by
extrapolating historical data may underestimate the actual cost.
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398 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4







Á ] and (
¹ R1¹
Á ;1):











































































= ¯(We(0;0) + 1 +
Á
¹
(1 + r)m) ¡ ¯
Z ¹ R2
0
(1 + r)RidRi ¡ ¯
Z 1
¹ R2





= We(0;0) + ¯ ¡ ¯
Z ¹ R2
0
(1 + r)RidRi ¡ ¯
Z 1
¹ R2







= ¯We(0;0) + ¯ ¡
¯(1 + r) ¹ R2
2
2
¡ ¯ ¹ R2(1 + r)(1 ¡ ¹ R2) ¡ ´ + [¯
Á
¹































= ¯We(0;0) + ¯
Á
¹




1 ¡ (1 + r)RidRi
= ¯We(0;0) + ¯
Á
¹
(1 + r)m + ¯
Á
¹


















































= ¯We(0;0) + ¯ + ¯
Á
¹
(1 + r)m ¡ ¯(1 + r)
Z ¹ R1
0
RidRi ¡ ¯(1 + r) ¹ R1(1 ¡ ¹ R1)
= ¯We(0;0) + ¯ + ¯
Á
¹




¡ ¯(1 + r) ¹ R1(1 ¡ ¹ R1)
We now show that, in the proposed equilibrium, the optimal money holding stays in the interval
[0;
¹ R2¹
Á ]. In particular, we will show:
(1) V 1
e (m) ¡ Ám = k for m 2 [0;
¹ R2¹
Á ] where k is a positive constant
(2) V 2






e (m) ¡ Ám < k for m 2 (
¹ R1¹
Á ;1)
First, consider the equilibrium with r > 0. Using the result that ¹ R1 =
¯





2(¹¡´)2, and 1 + r =
¹¡´
¯ , we can simplify the Ve derived above to get the followings:
(1) V 1
e (m) ¡ Ám
= ¯(We(0;0) + 1) ¡
¯(1 + r) ¹ R2
2
2
¡ ¯ ¹ R2(1 + r)(1 ¡ ¹ R2) ¡ ´ + [¯
Á
¹




= ¯(We(0;0) + 1) ¡
¯(1 + r) ¹ R2
2
2
¡ ¯ ¹ R2(1 + r)(1 ¡ ¹ R2) ¡ ´ + Ám ¡ Ám
= ¯(We(0;0) + 1) ¡
¯(1 + r) ¹ R2
2
2
¡ ¯ ¹ R2(1 + r)(1 ¡ ¹ R2) ¡ ´
= ¯We(0;0) + ¯ ¡
¯2 + ´2 ¡ 2¯´
2(¹ ¡ ´)
¡






= k > 0
(2) Similarly, we get V 2








. We can show
that V 2
e ¡Ám is strictly concave and attains its maximum at m =
2(¹¡´)
(¯¡´) (which is the lower bound
of region 2), with the maximum equals to k. Therefore, V 2





41(3) First, note that V 3
e (m)¡Ám is linear and strictly decreasing with d
dm[V 3
e (m)¡Ám] = ¡
Á
¹´ <
0. So, for any m 2 (
¹ R1¹
Á ;1), V 3
e (m) ¡ Ám is lower than V 3
e (
¹ R1¹
Á ) ¡ Á(
¹ R1¹
Á ) = We(0;0) +
¡2¯´+¯2
2(¹¡´)
which is lower than k if
´2
2(¹¡´) > 0.
Now, we consider the equilibrium with r = 0. (16) implies that ¹ = ¯ + ´. We can follow
the same analysis as above to show that V 2
e (m) ¡ Ám is maximized at m =
¹ R2¹
Á which is equal to
V 1
e (m) ¡ Ám for any m 2 [0;
¹ R2¹
Á ]. Also, r = 0 implies ¹ R1 = 1, so the third region vanishes.
So, we have proved that argmaxmVe(m)¡Ám 2 [0;
¹ R2¹
Á ], indeed in equilibrium an entrepreneur
is indi®erent between any m in this interval. Now we need to check that this is not an empty set,
that is ¹ R2 ¸ 0 which requires ´ · ¯. Finally, r ¸ 0 requires ´ · ¹ ¡ ¯.
Proof of Condition (19)
We want to show that argmaxm Ve(m)¡Ám >
¹ R2¹
Á when r = 0 and condition (19) is satis¯ed.
First, it is easy to show that, when r = 0, V 2
e (m) ¡ Ám in the previous proof attains its global
maximum at m =
¹ R2(¯+´)
Á . Then, to show that choosing m ·
¹ R2¹
Á is not optimal (where V 1
e is
the corresponding value function), note that V 2
e (
¹ R2¹
Á ) ¡ Á
¹ R2¹
Á = V 1
e (m) ¡ Ám for all m ·
¹ R2¹
Á .




Á which is equivalent to (19).
Proof of Proposition 4
Firstly, consider the case with r > 0. Condition (16) implies that ¹ ¡ ´ ¡ ¯ > 0. Condition
(18) then implies ÁCB =
¹(¯¡´)2
2(¹¡´)2. Then condition (17) is satis¯ed if and only if
Proof of Proposition 5
¹ RB =
¯
¹ ¸ ¹ RCB =
¯¡´
¹¡´ is obvious. Also, ¹ RCB =
¯¡´
¹¡´ ¸ ¹ RNB = 2¡
¹
¯ if (¹¡¯)(¯ ¡¹+´) · 0.







, (¯ ¡ ´)2 · 2(¯ ¡ ´)(¹ ¡ ´)
, (¯ ¡ ´)(¯ + ´ ¡ 2¹) · 0
, ´ · ¯:
Now, consider the case with r = 0. Condition (16) implies that ¹ ¡ ´ ¡ ¯ = 0. Condition (18)
then implies ÁCB ¸
¹(¯¡´)2
2(¹¡´)2. Then condition (17) is satis¯ed if and only if
42ÁCB · ¹ R2¹
, ÁCB ·
(¯ ¡ ´)(¯ + ´)
¯
) ´ · ¯; if ÁCB ¸ 0
Proof of Proposition 8
First, ¹ WNB(´) < ¹ WCB(´) for ´ = 0.
Second, ¹ WNB(´) > ¹ WCB(´) for ´ = ¹ ¡ ¯
Finally, for ¹ = 1, sign( ¹ WCB ¡ ¹ WNB) =sign(D(´)) where D(´) = (1 ¡ ¯)2((1 ¡ ´)2 ¡ ¯2) ¡
´(¯ ¡ ´)¯2(2 ¡ ´ ¡ ¯). From above, we know already that D(0) > 0 and D(1 ¡ ¯) < 0. Also, we
can show that dD
d´ (1 ¡ ¯) < 0 and d2D
d´2 > 0, implying that dD
d´ < 0 for ´ 2 (0;1 ¡ ¯). Therefore,
there exists a cuto® ¹ ´ such that ¹ WNB = ¹ WCB:
Proof of Proposition 10
For any ´ 2 (0;minf¯;¹ ¡ ¯g), j d
d¹ ¹ WCBj < j d
d¹ ¹ WNBj:





















d¹ (1 ¡ ¹ RCB

























































So the welfare e®ect of in°ation is smaller with banking when
j d










¯2 , since ¹ ¡ ¯ > 0
, (1 ¡ ´)(¯ ¡ ´) <
(¹¡´)2
¯2 (¹ ¡ ´) , since ¹ ¡ ´ > ¯
which is true since
(1 ¡ ´)(¯ ¡ ´) < ¯ <
(¹¡´)2
¯2 (¹ ¡ ´)
General Production Function
Suppose F(I;h) = If(h) with f0 > 0 and f00 < 0. Also, we assume that the utility of agents
is given by X ¡ D(Y ), with D0 > 0 and D00 > 0. The labor demand is then given by the F.O.C.
fh(I;h) = w; which implies a labor demand function h(I;w): The labor supply is characterized by
D0(H) = w, which implies a labor supply function H(w): We ¯rst consider the equilibrium with
banking. Here, the equilibrium prices (Á¤;w¤) and allocation of ideas I¤ are jointly determined:







where h¤ = h(I¤;w¤) and ¼(I;w¤) = If(h(I;w¤)) ¡ h(I;w¤):









Similarly, in an equilibrium with costless banking, the prices (Á¤;w¤;r¤) and allocation I¤ are
given by:





(ii) The fraction of ideas traded:









(iv) The banking sector equilibrium:
Á¤
¹
=
Z I¤
0
¼(I;w¤)dI:
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